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ABSTRACT 
 
The literature has explored the effects of welfare policy reforms on women’s labor supply.  However, 
a comprehensive analysis has not been conducted regarding the effects of individual policy 
instruments in public assistance programs.  This paper examines whether policy instruments in the 
public health insurance program affect women’s labor supply decisions, specifically, after we 
control for the effects of policy instruments in the welfare program.  The results indicate that, on 
average, public health insurance policy instruments did not affect women’s labor supply.  Our 
analysis implies that, regarding the recent reform on public assistance programs, the crowd-out of 
private health insurance for public health insurance is less likely to arise via a reduced labor supply 
channel. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he United States dramatically changed public assistance policies during the 1990s.  The passing of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) converted the welfare 
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), to Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF).  While government control of AFDC was relatively centralized, TANF gives states increased 
freedom to tailor welfare policies.  Similarly, the provision of public health insurance has been a state initiative since 
the early 1990s.  The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was enacted as part of the Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997.  SCHIP expanded public health insurance coverage to children who did not previously qualify for 
Medicaid.  Several states began to offer health insurance to working adults in the mid-1990s. 
 
This paper examines whether policy instruments in public assistance programs affect women’s labor supply 
decisions.  The literature has explored the effects of welfare reforms on women’s labor supply (Moffitt, 1999; 
McKernan et. al., 2000; Schoeni and Blank, 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; O’Neill and Hill, 2001; Fender et al., 
2002; Grogger, 2003; see also the survey by Moffitt, 2001).  Previous works consider the effects of a welfare reform 
using selected policy instruments.  While the examination of individual instruments is of increasing research interest, 
a comprehensive analysis regarding the effectiveness of instruments in public assistance programs does not exist 
(Moffitt, 2001; Danielson and Klerman, 2004).   
 
In an attempt to fill this gap, we study the effects of various policy instruments on women’s labor supply 
decisions.  Specifically, our analysis examines the effects of public health insurance policy instruments after 
controlling for the effects of welfare policy instruments.  The analysis relates two branches of the literature.  The first 
is the effects of welfare reforms on women’s labor supply.  The second is the effects of public health insurance 
reforms on women’s labor supply.  Several articles study possible effects of Medicaid expansions for children on 
women’s labor supply decisions (see the survey by Gruber and Madrian, 2002).  Very few attempts have been made at 
analyzing the effects of both welfare and public health insurance programs together on women’s labor supply 
decisions.   
 
We conduct a comprehensive analysis on the relationships between policy instruments in public assistance 
programs and women’s labor supply.  Our analysis shows that, on average, policy instruments in the public health 
insurance program did not affect women’s labor supply, once we control for the effects of policy instruments in the 
T 
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welfare program.  The results call for further investigation regarding the crowd-out of private health insurance 
coverage for public health insurance coverage.  The literature shows the possibility of crowd-out occurring during the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s.
1
 However, our analysis implies that crowd-out is less likely to arise as the result of the 
recent public assistance program reforms via a reduced labor supply channel. 
 
BACKGROUND
2
 
 
AFDC was implemented under the Social Security Act of 1935.  This program provided cash assistance to 
needy families with children.  States created and administered AFDC programs in accordance with federal regulations 
and guidelines.  Since 1962, states have been allowed to implement changes to their individual welfare programs.  
States were allowed to deviate from the federal regulations by obtaining waivers from the Department of Health and 
Human Services.  Examples of state specific stipulations include family caps, time limits on benefits, and benefits 
sanctions on welfare recipients who do not comply with job-related activity requirements.  In 1996, the PRWORA 
replaced AFDC with TANF.  States were given complete freedom in determining and administering their own welfare 
programs.  By 1998, all states had implemented a TANF program.   
 
AFDC participants, in addition to receiving cash handouts, were also given Medicaid coverage and food 
stamps as part of the benefits package.  Medicaid was established to cover AFDC participants with the Social Security 
Amendments of 1965.  However, the link between AFDC and Medicaid was severed through various legislative 
actions in the mid-1980s.  The federal government expanded Medicaid income eligibility requirements beyond AFDC 
income eligibility thresholds to provide health insurance coverage to poor pregnant women and children (Yelowitz, 
1995).  Starting in the mid-1990s, states began to institute either separate or state specific health insurance programs, 
as was typical under TANF implementation.  By 1996, 18 states submitted Medicaid waivers.   These 18 states 
expanded eligibility to a larger population of children.  In 1996, nine states (California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) instituted separate, state funded health 
insurance programs.  As part of the movement toward state initiated healthcare programs, the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP) was enacted as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  States were given flexibility in 
establishing state specific SCHIP.  States can expand their Medicaid program (M-SCHIP), establish a separate state 
program (S-SCHIP), or establish a combination of the two (COMBO).
3
 In additional to expanding healthcare benefits 
for children, several states employed either Medicaid waivers and/or state funds to offer health insurance to working 
adults in the mid-1990s.  In 1996, eight states (Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Vermont, and Washington) offered some form of public health insurance to working adults.  In 2000, 15 states and the 
District of Columbia offered some form of public health insurance to adults in poor families.   
 
In sum, we observe that both welfare and public health insurance programs began to vary at the state level in 
the mid-1980s.  All states obtained autonomy in designing their welfare and public health insurance programs by the 
mid-1990s. 
 
DATA  
  
We use the March Annual Demographic files of the Current Population Survey (CPS) covering the years of 
1996 to 2000.  The CPS is a nationally representative repeated cross-section survey that contains an average of 60,000 
households per year.  The CPS provides national data on public assistance for individual families as well as detailed 
demographic characteristics.  The survey is commonly used in the literature (e.g., Moffitt, 1999; O’Neill and Hill, 
                                                 
1 Several works study the effects of Medicaid expansions on the substitution of public health insurance for private health insurance.  The literature 
indicates there is a possibility that crowd-out occurred during the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Cutler and Gruber, 1996; Shore-Sheppard, 2000; 
Blumberg et al., 2000; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2001; Card and Shore-Sheppard, 2002). Kronick and Gilmer (2001) and LoSasso and 
Buchmueller (2002) find similar results when considering public health insurance expansions during the more recent periods of the late 1990s and 
the early 2000s. 
2 Moffitt (2001) presents detailed history of AFDC/TANF.  Blank and Ellwood (2001) summarizes recent changes in welfare, food stamp, and 
public health insurance programs.  Gruber (2000) provides a detailed account of the Medicaid program.  Refer to Cutler and Gruber (2001) for 
public health insurance policies during the 1990s. 
3 In March of 2000, 15 states created an S-SCHIP, 19 states had an M-SCHIP, and 17 states had a COMBO.  As of April of 2002, Maryland, South 
Dakota, and Texas had switched to a COMBO, and West Virginia had dropped M-SCHIP.   
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2000; Schoeni and Blank, 2000; Grogger, 2003).  We consider the time period after which state autonomy in 
designing welfare programs was complete.  Since states have been autonomous in designing welfare and public health 
insurance programs, there have been variations in employed policy instruments.   
 
Our analysis uses the full sample of women as in Moffitt (1999) and Schoeni and Blank (2000).  This results 
in a sample containing 185,682 women, ages 16-54.  Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our sample.  There are 
a couple of observations worthy of note.  First, the women’s labor force participation rate is stable at approximately 
77% each year.  Second, between 1996 and 2000, we observe a decrease in welfare participation rates.  Some works 
restrict their analysis to a sub-sample of single mothers, since married mothers and single non-mothers are not eligible 
for the welfare program.  However, there is evidence that welfare policies affect fertility and marital decisions.  
Additionally, Grogger (2003) says that restricting the sample may introduce sample selection bias (p. 395).  Selecting 
a full sample of women avoids this problem.  
 
Information on policy instruments is extracted from various sources (see Table 2).  Our analysis considers 
two instruments in public health insurance programs.  One is an indicator for public health insurance offerings to 
working adults.  The other is the monetary value of public health insurance benefits.  The latter is the so called public 
health insurance notch (Yelowitz, 1995; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000).  We use the maximum of either the Medicaid 
notch or the SCHIP notch as the public health insurance notch. 
 
The analysis controls for the effects of nine policy instruments in welfare programs.  The nine policy 
instruments are activity requirements, activity sanctions, diversion programs, time limits on benefits, family caps, 
welfare guarantees, earned income disregards, benefits reduction rates, and income eligibility tests.
4
  Brief 
explanations for each policy instrument are as follows.  States provide various job training programs to welfare 
recipients in order to promote working.  “Activity requirements” measure the degree to which each state makes such 
efforts.  Welfare recipients must participate in these programs to maintain their welfare benefits.  Otherwise, their 
benefits are discontinued.  “Activity sanctions” measure how strict states are in sanctioning those who do not satisfy 
the requirements.  Several states established a diversion program throughout the sample period.
5
 These programs aim 
to divert either eligible applicants and/or current recipients from welfare participation via benefits such as cash 
payments.  “Diversion programs” measure the effectiveness.  We also include an indicator for time limit policies on 
receiving welfare benefits.  Most states set time limits on receiving benefits to reduce the duration of welfare 
participation.  The remaining variables capture the state’s level of generosity with respect to welfare benefits.  “Family 
caps” are sets of policies that limit the marginal increase in welfare benefits for families that conceive an additional 
child while receiving aid.  “Welfare guarantees” are the amount of welfare benefits for a non-working welfare 
participant.  “A benefits reduction rate” is a rate at which welfare benefits decrease as earned income increases.  
“Earned income disregards” calculate financial incentives for non-working welfare participants who start and maintain 
full-time employment for one year at a state minimum wage rate.  Finally, each state implements different income 
eligibility tests for welfare benefits. 
 
Regarding the trends of the policy instruments, states became more generous in offering public health 
insurance during our sample period.  The public health insurance notch increased drastically.  This large increase is 
due to increased income eligibility for public health insurance after SCHIP implementation.  Several states also 
instituted a public health insurance program for working adults during the sample period.  Regarding the welfare 
program, there is trade-off among policy instruments.  With the introduction of TANF, states became more aggressive 
in activity sanctioning, but the number of activity requirements remained fairly constant.  The real value of earned 
income disregards increased by 58% and income eligibility threshold fell by almost half.  However, the real value of 
welfare guarantee fell and benefits reduction rates increased.  The latter changes make the welfare program less 
attractive.  The former changes make the welfare program more attractive. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Policy instruments such as welfare guarantees, earned income disregards, benefits reduction rates, income eligibility tests, and time limits, are 
often a main focus in the literature.  The AFDC literature examines the effects of the AFDC guarantees and benefits reduction rates (Hoynes, 1997).  
Moffitt (1999) uses welfare guarantees for a family of three, earnings disregards, lifetime limits, family caps, and sanctions.  
5 For example, Florida established a diversion program in 1997, Connecticut in 1999, and California in 2003. 
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RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
 We use a probit model to examine the effects of public health insurance instruments on women’s labor 
supply decisions.  In addition to the nine welfare program instruments described above, our model includes additional 
policy instruments that could affect women’s labor supply decisions.  They are annual salary level earned at the state’s 
minimum wage rates, the state and federal earned income tax credits, and an indicator for Medically Needy 
programs.
6
 These variables control for the effects of the earned income tax credit and minimum wage policy reforms 
during the sample period.  Our analysis also controls for demographic differences such as age, education, and race.  
Furthermore, we incorporate unobservable factors that could be related to women’s labor supply decisions and/or a 
policy endogeneity problem.  Year fixed effects are time varying elements that affect all states in a given year.  State 
fixed effects are time invariant elements that differ across states.  Different labor market conditions over time and 
across states are captured by four indicators: a state level unemployment rate, a lag of the state unemployment rate, an 
employment growth rate, and a lag of the employment growth rate.  The model may yield inconsistent estimates if 
time-varying factors across states affect the timing of the policy instruments used in each state.  Previous works 
suggest adding state-specific trends (CEA, 1997, 1999; Moffitt, 1999; Schoeni and Blank, 2000; Grogger, 2003; 
Ziliak et al., 2000) to incorporate such unobservable factors. Our model uses linear state-specific trends as in the 
literature. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis.  Public health insurance program instruments, on average, did not 
affect women’s labor supply decisions.  The results are not surprising.  Specifically, the effects of the public health 
insurance notch on work decision are theoretically ambiguous due to both substitution and income effects.  Some 
women may have decreased labor supply in order to become eligible for public health insurance.  However, others 
may have increased their labor supply if they previously chose not to work or chose to work reduced hours in order to 
be eligible for public health insurance.  With a higher public health insurance notch, the family can now increase their 
income and still maintain public health insurance coverage. 
 
Only three of the welfare program policy instruments are found to affect women’s labor supply.  
Employment increases with additional job-related activities required for the welfare program.  The activities help 
women to acquire the skills necessary for job hunting.  Concerning recent financial incentive instruments, increased 
benefit reduction rates encouraged women to work, but increased earned income disregards discouraged women from 
working.  These results are consistent with Moffitt (1997), who suggests a 100% benefit reduction rate and no earned 
income disregards in order to promote working.   
 
Remaining policy instruments did not affect women’s labor supply decisions at statistically significant levels.  
The goal of some policy instruments was to promote working.  However, in some cases, the governments’ objectives 
did not seem to be satisfied.  For example, a diversion program provides a financial incentive for non-working welfare 
participants to start working. Yet, current working non-welfare participants may have reduced their work in order to 
obtain the benefits.  The unintended impact is due to changes in opportunity cost faced by non-welfare participants.  
The two counterbalancing effects could have decreased the precision of the estimate.   
 
We examine the robustness of our findings using alternative specifications.  The further analysis examines 
public health insurance notches for an infant (age less than 1), a 7-year-old child, and a 17-year-old child.  Overall, 
female labor supply is not sensitive to any particular age group notches.  We also control for states’ business cycle 
effects using the current and lagged per capita real disposable income and the current and lagged real value of the 
Gross State Product.  Previous results remain robust in the presence of additional control variables or under alternative 
specifications. 
 
We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the effects of public assistance program policy instruments.  This is 
because the literature using selected policy instruments provides mixed results.   Some works do not find evidence that 
Medicaid expansions affected single mothers’ labor supply (Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 
2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001).  Other works show that Medicaid expansions decreased the labor supply of 
                                                 
6 Under the Medically Needy program, states can extend Medicaid coverage to individuals who are in families with income above the Medicaid 
income threshold. 
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single mothers (Blank, 1989; Winkler, 1991; Moffitt and Wolfe, 1992; Yelowitz, 1995).  Our analysis shows that, on 
average, public health insurance policy instruments did not affect women’s labor supply, once we control for the 
effects of welfare policy instruments.  The results provide governments with useful guidance regarding how to 
coordinate several public assistance program policy instruments.  The results also provide policy insight into the 
crowd-out of private health insurance for public health insurance possibly resulting from the recent public assistance 
program reforms.  Crowd-out can result from reduced labor supply.  If some women decreased their labor supply in 
response to public health insurance program reforms, then the goals of the reform were not achieved.  Families may 
choose to drop their children’s private health insurance in lieu of public coverage via reduced income.  Our results 
imply that crowd-out via reduced labor supply is less likely to arise, since we do not find any evidence of women 
changing their labor supply in response to public health insurance policy changes. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This paper examines whether policy instruments in the public health insurance program affect women’s labor 
supply decisions, specifically, after controlling for the effects of welfare policy instruments.  We consider the time 
period after which state autonomy in designing public assistance programs was complete.  Since states have been 
autonomous in designing welfare and public health insurance programs, there have been variations in the policy 
instruments employed.   
 
Our analysis shows that, on average, policy instruments in the public health insurance program did not affect 
women’s labor supply, once we control for the effects of the welfare program policy instruments.  The results call for 
further investigation in order to thoroughly assess the crowd-out of private health insurance coverage for public health 
insurance coverage.  The literature shows the possibility of crowd-out during the late 1980s and the early 1990s.  Our 
analysis implies that crowd-out is less likely to result from the recent public assistance program reforms via a reduced 
labor supply channel. 
 
Our analytical framework is applicable to other situations.  We consider all women to avoid sample bias.  
Nonetheless, an analysis of a sub-sample could be of interest.  The use of a sub-sample helps avoid parameter 
heterogeneity, as alluded to by Grogger (2002, 2003).  If the degree to which welfare policy affects fertility and 
marital decisions is negligible, the current empirical analysis may underestimate the effects of policy instruments (i.e., 
parameter heterogeneity is a more serious issue than sample bias).  Studying a sub-category of single women extends 
the current study to address these issues.  Our current analysis provides aggregate impacts of policy instruments on 
female labor supply.  The effects of public assistance programs may vary among different socio-economic groups.  
Using various sub-samples and comparing results would provide better understanding of the policy effects and their 
implication beyond what was already found in this paper.  These topics represent potential future lines of research.  
____________________ 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
We would like to thank Janet Currie, Jonathan Gruber, and Aaron Yelowitz for providing various datasets and David 
Neumark and Bill Wascher for providing minimum wage data.  We are also grateful to Marigee Bacolod, David 
Brownstone, and Molly Sherlock for their suggestions and comments.  Specifically, the second author would like to 
thank Sarah Senesky for her countless hours of help as a thesis advisor.  The first author appreciates financial support 
from the Research Foundation of the City University of New York.  All views and errors are ours. 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – September 2006                                  Volume 5, Number 9 
 24 
Table 1:   Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
All Years 
Work 0.770 0.420 
Welfare Use 0.034 0.180 
1996 
Work 0.761 0.425 
Welfare Use 0.049 0.215 
1997 
Work 0.768 0.422 
Welfare Use 0.038 0.191 
1998 
Work 0.770 0.421 
Welfare Use 0.031 0.173 
1999 
Work 0.778 0.416 
Welfare Use 0.027 0.162 
2000 
Work 0.775 0.418 
Welfare Use 0.023 0.149 
 Fraction Std. Dev. 
Age Categories   
Ages 16-25 0.233 0.423 
Ages 26-34 0.234 0.423 
Ages 35-44 0.293 0.455 
Ages 45-54 0.240 0.427 
Race   
White 0.837 0.369 
Black 0.109 0.311 
Asian, Pacific Islander 0.040 0.197 
American Indian, Eskimo 0.014 0.117 
Education   
Less than a High School Diploma 0.183 0.387 
High School Graduate 0.303 0.459 
Some College or an Associates Degree 0.291 0.465 
Four Year College Graduate 0.162 0.369 
Masters, Professional, Ph.D. 0.061 0.239 
Age of the Youngest Child in the Family given that a child exists 7.012 5.182 
Total Number of Children in the Family given that a child exists 1.905 0.968 
Number of Observations 185,682   
Note: Std. Dev. denotes the standard deviation. We classify a woman as a welfare participant if she is reported as receiving 
income from the public assistance or welfare program.  We classify a woman as a worker if her usual weekly hours are 
reported as positive.   
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Table 2:  Data Sources 
AFDC And TANF Policies  
We use the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database to characterize states’ welfare policies for a specific year.  The 
database provides a detailed account of welfare rules across all 50 states and the District of Columbia for 1996 to 
2000.   
Food Stamp Program  
The U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. Various Years. Characteristics of Food Stamp 
Households. Unpublished reports. 
Public Health Insurance Programs (Medicaid, SCHIP, Medically Needy, And Adult) 
We extract data on the public health insurance programs fromYelowitz’s dataset and the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services’ website (http://www.cms.gov/).  We extract the Medically Needy programs and the adult public 
health insurance programs information from various sources: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2002), 
FamiliesUSA (2001), Guyer and Mann (1999), Health Care Financing Administration (2001) 
(http://www.hcfa.gov/init/kidssum.htm), Kaiser Family Foundation’s website (http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/), 
Lambrew (2001), Rosenbach et al. (2001), Rosenbaum et al. (1999a), Rosenbaum et al. (1999b), Rosenbaum et al. 
(2001a), Rosenbaum et al. (2001b), and Rosenbaum and Smith (2001) and Various State Department of Human 
Services.  
Federal Poverty Guidelines  
The dollar amounts of federal poverty guidelines are available from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services website (http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/poverty.htm).   
Earned Income Tax Credit (State And Federal) 
The National Bureau of Economic Research, TAXSIM program’s website (http://www.nber.org/taxsim), and 
Feenberg and Coutts (1993).   
State Level Minimum Wage Rates  
We obtain the data from David Neumark and Bill Wascher. 
Per Capita Disposable Personal Income (State) 
The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis website (http://www.bea.gov/). 
The Consumer Price Index (Cpi)  
The U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics website. We deflate all monetary values with the CPI to 
2000 dollars. 
Unemployment Rates  
The U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics website (http://www.bls.gov/). 
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Table 3: The Results Of The Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public Health Insurance Notches  0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Working Adult Public Health Insurance Programs (Indicator) 0.022 0.019 0.018 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Activity Sanctions (higher number indicates more sever 
sanctions) 
0.019 0.02 0.021 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)* 
Activity Requirements (higher number indicates more 
allowable activities) 
0.009 0.008 0.008 
(0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** 
Diversion Programs (higher number indicates more generous 
program) 
0.008 0.007 0.007 
(.005)* (0.005) (0.005) 
Time Limit on Welfare Benefits (Indicator) 0.003 0.008 0.006 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Real Value of Welfare Benefits (1000s) -0.009 -0.021 -0.013 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Benefits Reduction Rates 0.001  0.001 
(0.000)***  (0.000)** 
Earned Income Disregards (1000s)  -0.01 -0.008 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)** 
Family Caps (higher number indicates more aggressive 
policy) 
-0.001 0.006 0.006 
(.008) (.009) (.009) 
Income Tests (the percentage of poverty guidelines) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 185,682 185,682 185,682 
Note: The standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering within state-year cells as in Moulton (1986).  The first 
model excludes earned income disregards.  The second model excludes benefit reduction rates.  The two instruments 
measure a similar effect (i.e., financial incentives to promote work) and are correlated.  The last model includes both 
instruments.   
All regressions include age, education, and race dummies as well as time and state dummies and state specific trends.  We 
also include an unemployment rate and its lag, an employment growth rate and its lag, the real value of the annual salary 
calculated at the minimum wage rate, the real value of the state and federal earned income tax credits for a family of three, 
and an indicator for the Medically Needy Program.   
* statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level 
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